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to be limited to its facts, 10 2 and those which find the broad principles of the
decision suggestive enough to warrant a wider use of the reserved power of
the state' 03 If one trend is to be noted which stands out in this clash of the
decisions of the state courts, it is that the Blaisdell Case is being seized upon
to justify emergency legislation not alone in the field of mortgages but in other
branches of the law as well.

SuRvIVAL AND REvIvAL OF PEPsoNAL INJURY ACTIONS IN THE CONFLICT

LAWS.-Modern opinion having rejected the ancient notion of tort liability
as a punitive rather than a compensatory measure,' the outworn rule of the
common law that personal actions2 die with the persona has gradually yielded
to the attacks of a more realistic jurisprudence. 4 While the category of surOF

102. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N. W. 701 (Iowa 1934).
The attempt by this court to construe the Iowa statute so that it satisfied the requirements set out in the Blaisdell decision is indicative of the belief of this court that the
criteria of reasonableness must be satisfied before the statute can be upheld. While the
Wisconsin court in Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co., 255 N. W. 136 (Wis. 1934) used some
very broad language in interpreting the Blaisdell decision, the court held the statute
unconstitutional since it did not satisfy the criteria of reasonableness established by the
decision. See note 19, supra.
103. Sewer Improvement Dist. v. Delinquent Lands, 188 Ark. 738, 68 S. W. (2d) 80
(1934) (Blaisdell decision used to sustain a general change of remedies); Town of
Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 357 Ill. 52, 191 N. E. 289 (1934) (constitutionally bound
to follow Blaisdell decision although statute not of usual mortgage moratoria); Dunn
v. Love, 155 So. 331 (Miss. 1934) (Blaisdell decision used to uphold release of part of
the liability of bank stockholders); Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153 (1934) (Blaisdell decision relied on to
sustain the power of superintendent to administer affairs of mortgage company).
1. Por ocx:, LAW oF ToRTS (12th ed. 1923) 578.
2. A right of action is of a personal nature if it is based upon an injury done to either
person or property for which the remedy is in damages. 3 BL. CoMxa. *117.
3. 3 BL. Co=am. *302; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885); United
States Casualty Co. v. Rice, 18 S. W. (2d) 760 (Tex. 1929). Under this doctrine the
personal representatives of a deceased tort-feasor could not, as a general rule, be held
responsible for torts of the decedent. Matter of Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Pain and bodily injuries were not regarded as possessed
of such transmissible qualities as to fix upon the living liability to atone for injuries
inflicted or suffered by the dead. Best v. Vedder, 58 How. Pr. 187 (N. Y. 1879).
Where, however, a direct result of the tortious conduct was the enrichment of the estate
of the wrong-doer, a recovery could be had. Osborn v. Bell, S Denio 370 (N. Y. 1848);
Hambly v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 371, 98 Eng. Reprints 1136 (1776).
4. See Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 239. The
explanation for the persistent denial of redress in tort at common law againt the rep-
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viving claims has been steadily enlarged by remedial legislation,u the statutory
abrogation of the common law rule with respect to actions for personal injuries
in a number of the states,6 and its retention in the remaining jurisdictions, have
given rise to problems which furnish adequate justification for the lament that
the field of conflict of laws "is one of the most thorny and difficult fields to
7
traverse."

'

resentative of the deceased tort-feasor is probably to be found in the criminal taint with
which trespass was originally colored. PoLLocr, op. cit. supra note 1. Since all criminal
amenability must be buried with the offender, the received maxim of the common law was:
actio personalis moritur curn persona. Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787
(1885). In the more advanced view, however, liability for tort is regarded as dependent
upon the requirements of punishment only with respect to its origin, while its continuance
is ascertained by resort to the principles of compensation. SAiwOND, JuISpRiDENcE (8th ed.
1930) § 149. The continued adherence to the common law rule, long after the last vestige
of criminality had been removed from trespass, was defended with the argument that
neither the executors of the injured party had received, nor those of the wrong-doer had
committed, in their own personal capacity, any species of wrong or injury. 3 BL. CoMM
*302; Best v. Vedder, 58 How. Pr. 187 (N. Y. 1879). But as far as the liability of the
representatives of the wrong-doer to afford redress is concerned, it is difficult to support
a distinction between the right of a creditor to recover his debt and the right of one who
has suffered an assault to be compensated for his injuries. As to the rights of the representatives of the person wronged, the sounder view would appear to favor the descent
of his right to redress to his representatives, as is the case with any other proprietary
interest. SALmOND, op. cit. supra. But see Winfield, supra at 249, where it is argued that
"the representatives of the injured party ought not to profit by a wrong which did not
harm them."
5. See Comment (1932) Q. N. Y. U. L. 9 Ray. 344; Notes (1929) 61 A. L. R. 830;
(1932) 78 A. L. R. 600.
6. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1923) §§ $712, 5713 (except injuries to reputation); Aimz.
REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3774; ARx. Dio. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921)
§ 1070 (except injuries to reputation); CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6177; ILL. Ray. STAT.
(Cahill, 1929) c. 3, § 125 (except injuries to reputation) ; IOWA CODE (1931) § 10957; KAN.
REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 60-3201, 60-3203; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) C. 101, § 8; MD. ANN.
CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1929) c. 93, § 106 (except actions for slander) ; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§ 3282; NE. CoMI.. LAws (Hillyer, 1930) § 9196; N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) c. 302,
§ 9; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 162 (except injuries to reputation and
actions for false imprisonment and assault and battery); N. D. ComP. LAws ANN.
(1913) § 8798; Omo CODE A-x. (Throckmorton, 1934) § 11235; OxrA. STAT. ANN.
(Harlow, 1931) §§ 568, 569 (except injuries to reputation and actions for malicious
prosecution); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) vol. 20, § 772 (except injuries to reputation); R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 4855; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 419; S. D.
Coup. LAWS (1929) §§ 2267, 2317; Tax. AnN. Cxv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5525; VT.
GEN. LAWS (1917) § 3310; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) §§ 5786, 5790; VAsn. CoMP. STAT.
(1922) § 967; W. VA. SEss. LAWS 1931, c. 20; Wisc. STAT. (1933) c. 287, § 1 (except injuries
to reputation); Wyo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 1227 (except injuries to
reputation and actions for malicious prosecution, assault, and assault and battery). In
Nebraska, personal injury actions survive at common law. Murray v. Omaha, 98 Neb,
482, 153 N. W. 488 (1915); Levin v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 185 N. W. 431 (1921).
7. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 337, 144 N. W. 1108, 1109
(1914).
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The Survival Cases

The cases raising the perplexing issues fall roughly into two groups. In
the first are cases wherein, subsequent to the death of one or both of the parties,
suit is brought in a state other than that in which the "cause of action arose.
These cases will be hereinafter referred to as the "survival cases." In the second group, the action is commenced in the lifetime of both parties, but one
dies during the pendency of the suit. These cases will be referred to as the
"revival cases." Since it may happen that personal injury actions survive or
may be revived by the lex loci8 but abate under the lex fori, or vice versa, it
frequently becomes important to determine which law will control.
It is established beyond dispute that in the determination of a case involving a conflict of laws, the lex loci will govern substantive rights, while the lex
Jori will control matters of procedure.10 But while the rule as stated is universally conceded, its application to concrete cases often becomes a matter
of considerable difficulty."' It has indeed been demonstrated that laws are
often both substantive and procedural,'- and that what is deemed substantive
for one purpose may well be regarded as procedural for another.'
O *g
8. The law of the place where the cause of action arose.

9- The law of the place where the action is brought.
10. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 AUt. 691 (1928); Dre=, Corucr or LAws (2d
ed. 1908) 70S; WmARTo, CoN' cr or LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 478b; Cook, "Substarce"
or "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, (1933) 42 YAnr. L. 3. 333.
11. The distinction between substantive and procedural law has been characterized
as artificial and illusory, having no real existence. CmaimR.Avz, EvoMMca § 171; see
also Cook, loc. cit. supra note 10. But, as the latest text-writer on the subject has observed,
"the distinction is made by courts and the lawyer must figure it out as best he can."
Goooe=cE, CoN-_cr or LAws (1927) 159, n. 2. The explanation for the complexity of
the subject is historical. Like most legal systems, the English was in origin largely
procedural. Thus it has been observed that "whenever we trace a leading doctrine of
substantive law far enough back, we are likely to find some forgotten circumstance of
procedure at its source.' HoLn=s, Co
oNoLAWe 253. With the growth of the Engli-h
legal system, however, many rules of procedure acquired a substantive character, leaving
the line of demarcation distinct in some cases, but barely preceptible in others. RPazTsAim-m, Cosrucr or LAws (Prop. Final Draft, 1931) c. 12, introductory note.
12. Comment (1918) 8 COL. L. Rav. 354. "Very many rules are only in app-arance
rules of procedure and really concern the legal relation itself." Vo. SAv.v,, PiVATS
IiTRNATIO-.zAL LAW (Guthrie trans. 2d ed.) 146-147.

"Many laws are only apparently

rules of procedure, but in truth are material laws." Vox BAR, PawATE I. =,,AT1ozAL LVw
(Gillespie trans. 1892) 497.
13. Barnet v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 222 N. Y. 195, 199, 118 N. E. 625, 626
(1918) ; Cook, supra note 10, at 337, 344. The development of the concepts of substance
and procedure in the field of conflicts, has, owing to historical reasons, been given an unfortunate turn. England's geographical isolation from the continent when her courts
were deciding the first cases in the field of private international law, produced a distortion
of the concepts to conform with a policy that was adverse to the recognition of principles
of foreign law. Accordingly the concept of substance was subjected to a process of
strict delimitation accompanied by a corresponding enlargement of the concept of procedure.
Comment (1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 315.
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to the manifold intricacies of this problem, a liberal view of interstate comity

would support enforcement of a foreign-created cause of action in every case
of doubt, unless such enforcement could not be effected without a disturbance
of the proper functioning of the machinery of litigation in the forum. 1 4 This
suggestion, of course, applies only to decisional doctrine and concedes the right
of one state to declare its own policy through its legislature. Whether the view
taken be liberal or conservative, however, the survival of a cause of action
would seem to fall clearly within the category of substantive matters. 15 Accordingly, the question of whether a claim for personal injuries survives the
death of either party ought to be governed by the lex loci and not the lex fori.'0
Nor is any sound reason perceived for placing upon a different ground the
question of whether such claims may be revived in the event of the death of
one party during the trial of the action.l 7

Though the foregoing would appear to be a correct exposition of the principles applicable to survival and revival cases generally, the reported decisions
sometimes manifest a failure to give those principles proper application. Both
14. Comment (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 315.
15. Martin's Adm'r v. Railroad, 151 U. S. 673 (1894); Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. & P.
R. Co., 61 Iowa 441, 16 N. W. 351 (1883); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242
N. W. 329 (1932); Burgess v. Gates, 20 Vt. 326 (1848); Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379,
191 N. E. 23 (1934); Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 294 (1865); cf. Chase
v. Ormsby, 65 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933). Contra: Matter of Killough's Estate, 148
Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933). In Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co.,
supra, the contention that the question of survival relates to the remedy, and should
therefore be controlled by the lex fori, was rejected. "But in our opinion," wrote the
court, "there is a question involved deeper than one pertaining merely to remedy." Wrongful-death statutes are generally regarded as affecting substantive rights. Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593 (1892); Davis v. New York & N. E. R. R., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E.
815 (1887); Whitlow v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry., 114 Tenn. 344, 84 S. W. 618 (1904).
Contra: Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627 (1887).
16.
See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (Prop. Final Draft, 1932) § 426, where
the general rule is stated to be that "whether a claim for damages for a wrong survives
the death of the wrongdoer or of the injured person is determined by the law of the place
of wrong." See also Rathgeber v. Sommerholder, 112 N. J. L. 546, 171 At. 835 (1934);
Burgess v. Gates, 20 Vt. 326 (1848); Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 856. A rather anomalous
view of the question has been taken by a federal court, which has held that whether a cause
of action for tort survives against the estate of the tort-feasor depends upon the law of
the latter's domicil, and not upon the lex loci. Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (1896). In
Matter of Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933), the
entirely novel argument was advanced that the New York statute abating personal Injury
actions upon the death of either party is, in effect, a statute of limitations limiting the
time for bringing suit to the lifetime of the parties, and that since the statute of
limitations is generally regarded as a matter affecting remedy and, accordingly, to be
governed by the lex fori, no action could be maintained against the estate of the tort-feasor.
It is submitted that this argument necessitates a perversion of the commonly accepted
understanding of statutes of limitation.
17. See (1928) 28 COL. L. Rimv. 498.
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Mlinnesota' s and lissouri' 9 have correctly held that where a cause of action
for personal injuries survives by the lex loci, it will be enforced notwithstanding that such an action would terminate under the lex fori20 But, following
closely upon a series of conflicting decisions in the lower courts, 2 ' the recent
case of Herzog v. Sterntm decided by a divided bench in the New York Court
of Appeals, held that such an action is not maintainable in the courts of New
York. The prevailing opinion, while conceding the soundness of the doctrine
that the survival of a cause of action is determinable by the law of the
place of the wrongt m adopted a qualification suggested by the Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws:
"If a claim for damages for injury survives by the law of the place of wrong, recovery
may be had upon it by or against the representative of the deceased party, provided the
law of the state of suit permits the representative of the deceased party to sue or be sued
on such a claim. Without such power created by the law of the state of suit, no recovery
can be had." 24

It is submitted that this restriction is without sound logical basis and, if
rigidly enforced, would frequently strip the general rule of its operative force.
In view of the universal acceptance of the doctrine that the lex loci governs
all matters of substantive law while the lex fori controls only procedural matters,25 it must be assumed that the draftsmen of the Restatement viewed the
question of whether the forum permits such an action to be brought by or
against the executors of the decedent as a mere question of procedure. But
conceding the line of demarcation between substantive and procedural mat18. Chubbuck v. Ho]loway, 182 Min. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 182 Minn. 231, 234 N. W. 868 (1931); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591,
242 N. W. 329 (1932).
19. Burg v. Knox, 67 S. W. (2d) 96 (Mo. 1933).
20. While in the Burg Case, the Missouri court based its decision upon a statute
which provides that where a cause of action has accrued under the laws of another state,
an action can be maintained thereupon in the courts of Missouri, the spirit of the decision
supports the view taken by the courts of Minnesota.
21. That the action is maintainable: Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y.
Supp. 355 (4th Dep't 1932); Taynton v. Volner, 271 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
that the action is not maintainable: Matter of Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933); cf. Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. E03
(Sup. Ct. 1920), a_#'d 194 App. Div. 923, 184 N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dep't 1920) (involving
the question of revival).
22. 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), cert. denied, U. S. L. Week, Oct. 9, 1934, at
103, col. 3. The plaintiff, having sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident
occurring in Virginia, brought an action against the executor of the alleged vrong-doer.
Under a Virginia statute, such claims are enforceable against the estate of the tort-feasor,
but by § 120 of the New York Decedent Estate Law, the death of either party abates
the action. The court held, Pound, C. J., and Hubbs, J., dissenting, that the courts of
New York had no jurisdiction over the action.
23. Supra note 16.
24. Rw'TAT=E,
CoNimcr or LAws (Prop. Final Draft, 1932) § 426, comment (b).
Italics not in original.
25. See supra note 10.
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ters to be narrowly drawn, consistency demands that if the survival question
be deemed substantive, the question of whether suit may be brought against
the representative of the deceased tort-feasor should be placed in the same
category. Extraordinary perceptive powers would be required to discover a
substantial distinction between the principle that a cause of action survives
the death of a party and the statement that upon the death of such party an
action may be prosecuted against his estate.2 6 Mere changes in phraseology
do not alter the intrinsic identity. From the premise that the action does not
abate upon the death of the wrong-doer, it follows irresistibly that the action
may be maintained against his representative. 27 "It is not possible for one at
the same time to have a cause of action and not to have the right to sue."' "s
Moreover, the restriction suggested by the Restatement and adopted by
the New York Court of Appeals, contains the implication that where, under the
lex fori, personal injury claims are not enforceable against the representatives
of the wrong-doer, the case falls within the class of claims unenforceable because of the lack of adequate machinery of enforcement at the forum.2 9 But
this objection to affording redress on foreign-created rights is manifestly inapplicable to tort-survival cases. 30 Where no express statute forbids the enforcement by the courts of the forum of claims arising in other jurisdictions, sound
principle points the way to judicial recognition of such claims. No novel procedural rules need be devised for the adjudication of such suits. Jurisdiction
over the estate having been acquired by the service of process upon the personal representative of the deceased tort-feasor, the suit can be carried to completion in accordance with the ordinary machinery of procedure.3 1
26. When, in Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329 (1932), it was objected
by the defendant administratrix that under Minnesota practice there was no method of
enforcing liability against the estate of the deceased wrong-doer, the court replied: "We
do not so regard the law. In our opinion jurisdiction of the estate for the purpose of
establishing liability against it in this kind of a suit is acquired by service upon the
personal representative. . . . We apprehend that if a trespass had been committed in
Wisconsin by Johnson there would be no question but that suit against the personal
representative could be maintained here. . . . That being the case, we see no reason why
our judicial machinery cannot determine and enforce liability against the estate by suit
against the personal representative on a tort which survives by the substantive law of
that state . . ."
27. "By this phrase [cause of action] is understood the right to bring an action, which
implies that there is some person in existence who can assert, and also a person who can
lawfully be sued." BouvixR, LAW DICTIONARY tit., "Cause of Action." See also Parker
v. Enslow, 102 11. 272 (1882).
28. Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 263, 88 N. E. 651, 653 (1909); Jacobus
v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837 (1916). "A right without a remedy Is a right
only in name." Kuhn, Doctrines of Private International Law in England and America
Contrasted with those of Continental Europe (1912) 12 COL. L. Rxv. 44, 54.
29. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120 (1904); 2 WHARTON, op. Cit. supra
note 10, at 1123; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 196.
30. Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329 (1932).
31. Ibid.
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In cases like Orr v. Ahern,3 2 the converse of the Hcrzog v. Stcrn set-up is

presented. In the Orr Case suit was brought in a Connecticut court for personal injuries occasioned by the negligent conduct of the defendant's intestate
in New York. Under a Connecticut statute a claim for personal injuries continues against the executor, while in New York the death of the wrong-doer
abates the action.33 The Connecticut court properly refused to take jurisdiction on the ground that the cause of action, having arisen in New York,
was governed by the law of that state and, having abated under New York

law, the right to redress no longer existed anywhere. The same view has
generally been entertained in other jurisdictions, 3 4 but a federal court has
taken a diametrically opposite standVn5

The Revival Cases

Nowhere is the confusion on this subject better illustrated than in the
revival cases. In cases of this type one of the parties dies pending an action
commenced during his lifetime. The complications are caused by the ques-

tion of what law is to govern the revival of such an action. In most cases
it has been held that the revival of the action is governed by the law of the
forum, so that if by that law pending actions abate, the action will not be
continued against the personal representative, even though under the kex loci
a like action then pending would be revived;3 0 and conversely, if the law of the
forum revives such claims, the action will be continued even though such
cause of action would abate under the law of the situs.37 It is difficult to discover a defensible ground for such decisions.-s

The cause of action when

32. 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928).
33. DscmErN
EsTATE LAw (1909) § 120.
34. Davis v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. 815 (1887); Friedman
v. Greenberg, 110 N. J. L. 462, 166 Ad. 119, 87 A. L. R. 849 (1933); Mfedcan C. R. Co.
v. Goodman, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 48 S. W. 778 (1898). In Davis v. New York & N. E.
R. Co., supra, the court clearly indicated the ground of its decision: "What the new
liability shall be, by what conditions it shall be controlled, and whether the original liability
shall be destroyed, must be determined by the law of the state where the injury occurs,
unless the legislation of other states is to have extraterritorial force, and govern transactions beyond their limits... !'
35. Chase v. Ormsby, 65 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
36. Clough v. Gardiner, 111 h3,sc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd
194 App. Div. 923, 184 N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dep't 1920). The decision was based upon
the theory that to permit revival of the action would be to transcend the declared
limits of the public policy of the forum. For an analysis of the concept of public policy
in the field of conflicts, see infra pp. 96-100.
37. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U. S. 226 (1889); Page v. United Fruit Co., 3
F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. lst, 1925), cert. granted, 269 U. S. 542 (1925), rev'd on other grounds,
274 U. S. 65 (1927); Luster v. Martin, 58 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Gordon v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 151 Iowa 449, 134 N. W. 1057 (1912); see Orr v. Ahern, 107
Conn. 174, 178, 139 At1. 691, 693 (1928).
38. See Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 852. The Connecticut court, in a dictum in the
case of Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 178, 139 Ad. 691, 693 (1928), cited note 37, supra,
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created by the lex loci, carries with it as a substantive matter any limitations
placed upon it by that law.3 9 If revival of such claims is not permitted by the
lex loci, the cause of action should terminate upon the death of either party
regardless of where the action is prosecuted. 40 Similarly, if the law of the
place of the injury revives such actions, there should be no abatement of the
suit even though under the lex fori such claims are not revived.
The Public Policy Argument
Having reached the conclusion that the question of the survival of a claim
for personal injuries is fundamentally one of substantive law and, accordingly,
governed by the lex loci,4 ' it becomes necessary to consider some additional
problems. It is elementary that the laws of one state have, proprio vigore, no
extra-territorial force, 42 and, with one or two important exceptions, 43 it is the
44
sovereign right of each state to refuse recognition to foreign-created rights.
has suggested what may be the correct rationale of the revival cases. The argument Is
that where an action is brought to secure a claim which arose in a foreign jurisdiction, the
right which the action thus seeks to enforce becomes a right in the jurisdiction of the
forum as soon as its courts have assumed jurisdiction. Since the right then exists by
force of the law of the forum, that law will determine the revival of the action, should
one of the parties die during its pendency. But it is submitted that this argument asssumes
too much. The right primarily recognized is the right acquired under the foreign law,
and, even though it be conceded that the forum does not directly enforce that right, but
substitutes a corresponding right therefore [see note 44, infra], the new right ought to
be equal to but no greater than the original one.
39. Thus it is clear that the law of the place of the act determines not merely the
existence of the obligation, but determines its extent as well. Slater v. Mexican National
R. Co., 194 U. S. 120 (1904). The Restatement furnishes direct support for the text
statement: "When a certain law is said to 'govern' a right of action it is meant that that
law applies to the right in all particulars: It creates the right, determines Its nature (for
instance, whether it is a cause of action for tort, whether it survives the death of a party,
etc.) fixes the measure of damages, determines the person who is entitled to its benefit
and person against whom it exists, and all other qualities of the right." RESTATmIENT,
See also Davis v. New
CoNFucr oF LAWS (Tent. Draft, 1928) § 427, comment (a).
York & N. E. R. Co., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. 815 (1887); Comment (1930) 47 Harr.
L. Rev. 129.
40. See (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 498.
41. See note 16, supra.
42. Lauria v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E. D. N. Y. 1917); Union
Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925) ; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public
Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALaL. J. 736.
43. See pp. 100-101 infra.
44. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918); Lorenzen,
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws--One Hundred Years After (1934) 48 Harv.
L. Rev. 15, 35-36. The recognition of a foreign created right, whether it be based upon
a statute or upon the common law, stands, in this respect, upon the same ground. The
forum is not, properly speaking, enforcing a foreign right. It is applying its own law to the
case, but in the process, adopts as its own law a rule substantially identical with the law
of the foreign state. The forum thus gives effect, not to a foreign right, but to a right
created by its own law. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(1924) 33 YAIE L. J. 453.
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However, the real question is not whether the power to refuse such aid exists,
but whether it ought, in accordance with the principles of interstate comity,
to be exercised. 45 To make the rights of the injured party dependent upon
the mere fortuity of the place where the defendant is apprehended, may often
work a substantial failure of justice.46 The unmistakable tendency of modem
decisions has been in the direction of a uniform interstate enforcement of vested
rights 47 and the conviction has taken hold that only extraordinary circumstances will justify one state in refusing to entertain suits on rights acquired
in another.4 s Notwithstanding the force of this tendency, however, if the
45. (1934) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 84.
46. Thus in Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931), rcv'd on
other grounds; 182 Minn 231, 234 N. W. 868 (1931), the court, in assuming jurisdiction,
wrote: "Our public policy is not such as to prompt us in turning him [the plaintiff]
from our door and relegating him to a foreign state where the defendant, parchance,
having no property could not be reached.... We should not make things better by snding
him to Wisconsin where suit may be impossible. We have no desire to etablish a policy
that would turn the citizens of this state from our courts, which have jurisdiction, into
a foreign state wherein their otherwise valuable cause of action might be worthleE3 for
want of jurisdiction.'
47. "The fundamental policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall be
everywhere maintained." Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co, 224 N. Y. 99, 113,
120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918). See also Rick v. Saginaw Bay Towing Co., 132 Mich. 237,
93 N. W. 632 (1903); Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931);
rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ilinn. 231,334 N. W. 868 (1931); Brown v. Perry 104 Vt. 66,
156 At. 910 (1931); Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27
Yale L. J. 656; Dodd, Te Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in e
Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533; Langmaid, The Fufl Faith and
Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 Il. L. Rev. 383. The application of the a
posteriori as distinguished from the a priori method to decisions in the law of conflicts has
resulted in the rejection of the vested rights theory by the advocates of the new approach.
In its place they substitute an appraisal of the actual basis of decisions in this field as
gleaned from a study of the reported cases. See Cook, loc. cit. supra note 44; Lorenzen, loc.
cit. supra note 42. The conclusion reached by this method is that "the general problem is
... always the same: What are the demands of justice in the particular situation; what
is the controlling policy?" Lorenzen, supra note 42, at 748. See also Cavers, The Choice of
Law Problem (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rnv. 173, at 178; Cook, loc. cit. supra note 44. If this
conclusion is to be accepted, there would seem to be no place for the doctrine of tare
decsis in the field of conflicts, since "it is the demands of justice in the particular situation"
that control the decision. But the correctness of the conclusion i open to question. The
binding force of precedent is forcefully indicated in the oft-quoted statement of Mr. Justice
Cardozo: 'Nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a court are predetermined-predetermined in the sense that they are predestined-their fate pre-etablisbed
by inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death. The range of free activity is relatively small. We may easily seem to exaggerate it through emphasis." Canozo, Gnovrr
or =e LAW 60. It is difficult to believe that the law of conflicts should be anomalous in
this respect. For a vigorous attack upon the profitless efforts of the "realists" to discover
uncertainty where only certainty exists, see Kennedy, Men or Laws (1932) 2 Bnooime.v L.
REv. 11.
48. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918). In the field of
penal claims, however, the tendency has rather been to rigidly enforce the rule with
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recognition of the foreign rights would be subversive to the public policy49
of the forum, redress will be denied." Unfortunately the ascertainment of
the precise meaning of the term "public policy" is no less difficult in the field
of conflicts than in other fields.5 ' It connotes something that is "uncertain,
fluctuating, varying with changing economic needs, social customs and moral
aspirations of the people.152 It is generally agreed, however, that before the
courts of one state will close their doors to rights acquired in another, it must
appear that the recognition of the foreign rights would be repugnant to good
morals and abstract justice, and would produce a serious disruption of the
53
local municipal law.
While the ground of the decision in Herzog v. Stern5 4 was lack of jurisdiction in the court of the forum because of the absence of any provision in the
law of New York for the maintenance of personal injury actions against personal representatives, the court intimated, by way of dictum, that the result
would have been the same had the question really been one of public policy.
The legislature, it reasoned, had declared the public policy of New York when
it provided that no action for personal injuries could be maintained against
the executor or administrator of a decedent residing in that state.05 But the
very statement of the proposition carries with it a sufficient refutation, and
precludes the extra-territorial enforcement of causes of action based upon penal laws.

But the wisdom of this policy has been seriously questioned. See Leflar, Extrastate Bnforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 193.
49.

The question of public policy is not peculiar to the enforcement of tort claims

arising in foreign jurisdictions, but is present potentially in nearly all cases Involving the
recognition and application of foreign law. WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 10, § 4a;
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 197.
50. Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1916); RFSTATEmENT, CoNrucr or LAws (Prop. Final
Draft, 1931) § 478a.
51. For a discussion of the general question of public policy, see Winfield, Public
Policy in the English Common Law (1928) 42 HARv. L. Rv. 76; Comment (1933) 33
COL. L. REv. 508.

52. Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S. C. 223, 122 S.E. 586, 587 (1924).
53. Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S.15, 21 (1916); Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co., 108 Conn.
436, 143 AtI. 568 (1928). The English courts have been exceedingly conservative in this
respect. Under the English rule, unless the act would have been a tort If committed in
England, there can be no enforcement of a cause of action predicated thereupon. The
Halley, L. R. 2 P. C. 193 (1868); Dicay, CoNFrCT or LAWS (3d ed. 1922); 6 HAasnuRnv
LAws or ENGLAND 248. This rule would seem to be based upon the abandoned concept
of tort liability as penal. See note 4, supra; GooDRaCH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 198. The

better view would seem to be that adopted by the American courts: that recovery for
a foreign tort will not be refused even though no liability would have been imposed by the
lex fori had the operative facts occurred there. Walsh v. New York & N. E, R. Co., 160
Mass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1894); Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W.
664 (1896).
54. 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), cited note 22, supra.

55. Id. at 384, 191 N. E. at 25. The same view had been previously taken in two
cases in the lower courts. Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup.
Ct. 1920), aff'd 194 App. Div. 923, 184 N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dep't 1920); Matter of
Kllough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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when it is considered that claims for personal injuries now survive in more than
half the states,r 6 it is difficult to perceive how the enforcement of a right
acquired under the survival statute of another state can seriously disturb
the moral security 57 of a community in which no survival statute esists.53
Thus the dissenting judges in the Herzog Case insisted that refusal to enforce
the foreign cause of action on the ground that it was repugnant to the public
policy of New York "would constitute an assumed virtue and superiority
which cannot be justified and which we should at least hesitate to announce.1139
The public policy of a state, moreover, is said to be found in its constitution
and laws and judicial decisions.60 But it is clear that public policy is broader
than the mere terms of a statute; it embraces its general purpose and spirit.01
It may be questioned whether the statutes enacted by some states codifying
the common law rule of actio personalis moritur cunt persona were calculated
to extend to actions arising under the laws of other states .02 The rule formerly obtained quite generally that recovery on a cause of action arising on
the statute of another state could not be had unless there was a statute in
56. See note 6, supra.
57. It has been suggested that there can never arise among the several states any cases

so extreme that the enforcement of a foreign right would be an offense against the morals
of the forum. The differences among the states are said to relate merely to minor matters
of expediency. Beach, loc. cit. supra note 47. See also RESTATEmEm, Co.unucr or Lkws
(Prop. Final Draft, 1931) § 620, comment (b). But this view has not always been accepted.
"There may be, and we cannot ascertain until inquiry, situations in which the foreign
law may be so obsolete or inimical to the social interests of the forum that to apply the
doctrine of the uniform of vested rights would defy justice." Yntezna, The Hornbooh
Method and the Conflicts of Laws (1928) 37 YA. L. J. 468, 479.
58. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Blinn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 182 Blinn. 231, 234 N. W. 868 (1931); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Blinn. 591, 242
N. W. 329 (1932); Burg v. Knox, 67 S. W. (2d) 96 (Mo. 1933); Dores v. Storms, 236
App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y. Supp. 335 (4th Dep't 1932); Taynton v. Vollner, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The argument has been advanced that where under the lex lcd
someone other than the tort-feasor is held responsible for the tort, and no similar recovery
is permitted under the law of the forum, public policy may prevent the forum from
entertaining the action. (1931) 15 Afmx. L. R.v. 705. This argument might be properly
applied to cases like Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927) (statute
at locus imposed upon parent liability for torts of child), where the person substituted for
the tort-feasor is not legally identifiable with him. But it has no force when applied to
survival cases, for the individual substituted here is a personal representative of the deceased
wrong-doer administering the latter's estate.
59. 264 N. Y. 379, 387, 191 N. E. 23, 26 (1934). "It would be an intolerable affectation
of superior virtue," writes Judge Beach, "for the courts of one state to pretend that a mere
enforcement of a right validly created by the law of a sister state would be repugnant to
good morals." Beach, loc. cit. supra note 47.
60. Vidal, Girard v. Mayor, 43 U. S. 126 (1844); People v. Martin, 175 N. Y. 315,
67 N. E. 589 (1903).
61. Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnip-Seed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542 (1913);
Johnston v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 164 S. W. 260 (Mo. 1914).
62. It is at least clear that survivorship statutes are designed to cover only situations
arising within the enacting states. Orr v. Ahern, 109 Conn. 174, 139 At]. 691 (1928).
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force at the forum substantially similar to that of the situs.03 But the clear
course of decision in recent years has been in the direction of giving the same
recognition to a foreign claim whether it arose under the common law or was
given by statute. 64
ConstitutionalProblems
The refusal of New York to entertain suit on a personal injury action subsequent to the death of the wrong-doer, raises the interesting question of
whether the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 6 is not
thereby violated. 66 The inclusion of the clause in the Constitution was
prompted in part by the realization of the necessity of placing the observance
of some principles of private international law upon a basis more substantial
than a tenuous interstate comity.67 But while the broad terms of the mandate
offered an opportunity to establish standards securing a virtual uniformity of
state legislation in the field of conflict of laws,08 the Supreme Court has
to date shown no particular desire to avail itself, of the opportunity. 9 Though
able arguments have been advanced to show that there ought to be no distinction between a case in which reliance is placed on the full faith and credit
clause as requiring recognition of the validity of a cause of action arising
under a statute of another state, and a case in which enforcement of a judg63. Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nay. Co., 84 N. Y. 48 (1881); Morris v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co., 65 Iowa 727, 23 N. W. 143 (1885); Burns v. Grand Rapids & 1. R. Co.,
113 Ind. 169, 15 N. E. 230 (1888) Texas & P. R. Co. v. Richards, 69 Tex. 375, 4 S. W.
627 (1887). The requirement that there be a similar statute at the forum has a tendency
to unduly hamper the operation of the principles of comity by assuming that the only
means of negativing the objection based upon the public policy of the forum Is to show
the existence of a similar statute. WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 10, § 480b.
64. Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892); Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock,
154 U. S. 190 (1894); Herrick v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141 N. E. 66 (1923); Herrlck
v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N. E. 413 (1883); Powell v. Great
Northern R. Co., 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017 (1907); Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N. 3.
L. 253, 49 Ati. 544 (1901); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E.
198 (1918).
65. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in every other State."
66. The conflict of laws is, of course, a part of the common law and Is binding upon
state courts as are other parts of the law of the state. It is not a body of law forced on
a state by any external power. RESTATKmmir, Coh-sucr or LAws (Prop. Final Draft,
1930) § 5. The freedom of each state to adopt its own rules of conflict of laws, however,
is not as great as it is with respect to other rules of law, for the full faith and credit clause
prescribes certain limitations the bounds of which may not be transcended with impunity.
Ibid. See also Lorenzen, supra note 42 at 750.
67. See Corwin, The Fdl Faith and Credit Clause (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 371.
68. Ibid. Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field
of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 Hagv. L. REv. 532; Lorenzen, supra note 42, at 750.
69. The potential developments based upon this clause are fully treated in Dodd, loc.
cit. supra note 68; Langmaid, loc. cit. supra note 47; Ross, Has the Confllct of Laws Be.
come a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 Mnw. L. REv. 161.
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ment granted in another state is sought,70 it is unlikely, in the light of the
strict interpretation of the clause in past decisions, that the distinction will
be easily obliterated. 7 ' But even supposing that the Supreme Court should
assume the status of a tribunal for effecting uniformity in the field of conflicts, 72 it is highly improbable that it would interfere with decisions of state
courts which refuse to allow the statutes of sister states to govern in cases
involving the survival of personal injury claims, for the substantial interest
of the forum in the administration of decedents' estates might well be deemed
an adequate justification for such refusal.
Another constitutional problem presented by these cases concerns the possible violation of the due process clause. Conceding the paucity of authority
on this subject, it is submitted that if the vested rights theory be accepted the
refusal of the forum to recognize the existence of the cause of action-a property right-because of some local statute, as in the Hcrzog Case, might be
interpreted as putting upon the local statute a construction which would render
it unconstitutional as effecting a deprivation of property without due process
of law.73 The force of this argument is emphasized in cases in which the
only property of the decedent is located in the forum. To refuse to recognize
the plaintiff's right in such a case is, in effect, to completely deprive him of
74
that right.
70. Dodd, supra note 68, at 540 et seq.
71. See Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 291, 295. In one line of cases the clause has
been construed to embrace causes of action arising under statutes of sister states. Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389
(1924); Modern Woodman of America v. Idixer, 267 U. S. 544 (1925). But thes cases
involve insurance contracts and appear to occupy a unique position.
72. The argument of those who would have the Supreme Court assume such position
is dearly put by Professor Lorenzen: "The rules are imposed upon them [the states],
and in the nature of things the rules are dictated by what the Supreme Court conceives to
be the general interest. The particular interests and policies of the different states are
submerged in these cases in the general interest of the nation." Lorenzen, supra note
42, at 750.
73. See Dodd, supra note 68, at 548.
74. It has been urged that the due process clause ought to be construed to protect
against all error in state decisions regardless of the question involved. Schofield, The
Supreme Cowt of the United States and the Enforcement of State Law by the Courts (1903)
3 Irm. L. Rnv. 195. But whatever the merit of the suggestion, a constitutional amendment
would probably be necessary to effect the dsired result. See Ross, loc. cit. supra note 69.

